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Non-Audit Fees and Auditor Independence:      
Nigerian Evidence 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose of this paper: This study aims to investigate the extent to which the provision of Non-
Audit Services (NAS) by external auditors to audit clients affects auditors’ independence and 
the audit expectation gap in Nigeria. 
Design/methodology/approach: The study adopts an interpretivist approach. Thirty semi-
structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted to explore the views expressed by audit 
partners and pension fund managers in Nigeria; group responses were evaluated and presented 
separately. After transcribing the interview audio recordings, a thematic data analysis of the 
two groups’ responses was performed. 
Findings: Interpretation of the interview responses indicates that the provision of NAS by audit 
firms to their audit clients is regarded by auditors as a matter of economic necessity. 
Nevertheless, it is also perceived as impeding auditors’ independence and increasing the gap 
between the auditor and public expectations.  
Practical implications: This study contributes to the debate surrounding the need for an 
independent body to oversee auditing standard setting distinct from the current practice to 
enhance transparency. 
The original/value of the paper: A qualitative analysis of the nuanced responses obtained from 
the semi-structured interviews reveals starkly the perceived economic pressures on auditors to 
accept non-audit work. Moreover, it endorses the regulation to restrict non-audit work in 
support of a sustainable fee level for independent audit.  
Key words: Auditor independence, Non-audit services, Expectation gap, Public 
confidence, Nigeria. 
JEL Classification: M42 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The contribution of regulation to audit quality through measures to promote auditor 
independence is the subject of ongoing debate in Nigeria and elsewhere, with some evident 
criticism of auditors (Akinbuli, 2010; Atu and Atu, 2010; Ilaboya and Ohiokha, 2014). 
Legislation in the USA has prevented auditors from providing nine specified non-audit services 
to audit clients, while requiring audit committee prospective authorisation for others (H.R. 
3763, 2002). However, despite consideration, restrictions on the provision of non-audit 
services by European auditors (European Commission (EC), 2002) were not implemented. 
Standards for Nigerian auditors remain based on principle and are relatively permissive. 
Currently, the issue for investors, companies, auditors and regulators concerns whether further 
regulation should be placed on Nigerian auditors’ activities in the pursuit of narrowing the 
expectation gap; specifically, the deficient standards gap after Porter (1993).  
Given that independence is a “state of mind” (ICAN, 2009), the authors of this paper believe 
an in-depth qualitative evaluation of auditors’ and shareholders’ reported perceptions 
contributes valuable evidence, unavailable elsewhere, to the debate.  
Quantitative studies have taken the occurrence of non-audit fees with the presence of 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for compromised auditor independence. The results of these 
studies are inconsistent (Tepalagul and Lin, 2015). Despite adopting a qualitative approach, 
this study contributes to the debate contained in the literature. Perceptions of auditor 
independence in Nigeria have been surveyed previously to identify the most significant 
perceived threats to independence (Adeyemi and Akinniyi, 2011; Adeyemi and Oloowokere, 
2012), elements of the audit expectation gap (Oloowokere and Soyemi, 2013; Onulaka, 2015), 
influence of non-audit fees on independence (Akinbowale and Babatunde, 2017), and the 
advantages and disadvantages of appointing joint auditors (Okaro et al, 2018). Such studies 
have attained international significance given the rapid development of the Nigerian economy, 
with a tenfold increase in GDP between 1997 and 2017 to rank thirtieth largest in the world 
(World Bank, 2018) and the nation’s role as the fourteenth largest producer of crude oil (Fantini 
and Quinn, 2017).  
This study contributes a further investigation specifically in relation to perceptions of the effect 
of non-audit fees on auditor independence. Where previous studies have analysed perceptions 
quantitatively using response scales, this study takes a more qualitative approach by 
thematically analysing interview responses. This study responds to Power and Gendron’s 
(2015) promotion of “multi-culturalism” of methods in audit research. The free form of 
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responses directs this study further towards the subjective part of the spectrum of approaches 
to social sciences contextualised to auditing by Dirsmith et al (2010) after Morgan and 
Smircich (1980). Through openness to issues that can be raised through this novel approach, 
the authors believe new ideas can and have been discovered; thereby contributing to the debate 
on regulation.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review in 
which studies relevant to the topic in Nigeria and worldwide are addressed over three 
subsections, with the final subsection used to state the study objective. Section 3 details the 
research method. Section 4 presents the analysis and, finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions 
of the research. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Independence 
Independence was said by Flint (1988) to be “probably the most important of the audit 
postulates”. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) confirms that auditor 
integrity requires independence, intellectual honesty, freedom from conflict of interest and an 
objective approach to the audit process (ICAN, 2009). In line with these assertions, the 
Nigerian Standards on Auditing (ICAN, 2013) states: “The engagement partners shall form a 
conclusion on compliance with independence requirements that apply to the audit 
engagement.” The Professional Code of Conduct and Guide to Members (ICAN, 2009) 
elaborates on two aspects of independence:  
“Independence of Mind”, defined as “the state of mind that permits the expression of a 
conclusion without being affected by influences that compromise professional judgment, 
allowing an individual to act with integrity, and exercise objectivity and professional 
skepticism.” 
“Independence in Appearance”, defined as “the avoidance of facts and circumstances that are 
so significant that a reasonable and informed third party, having knowledge of all relevant 
information, including safeguards applied, would reasonably conclude a firm’s, or a member 
of the assurance team’s, integrity, objectivity or professional skepticism had been 
compromised” (ICAN, 2009).  
Adeyemi and Akinniyi (2011) conducted a cross-sectional survey of the perceptions of 100 
Nigerian lecturers, auditors, stockbrokers, shareholders and managers of listed companies. In 
this study, the size of audit fees was concluded to be perceived as having the most significant 
effect on an auditor’s independence. In Adeyemi and Oloowokere’s (2012) study, of 142 
survey responses gathered from Lagos state investors, 66.9% agreed that auditors should not 
by law be allowed to provide non-audit services to audit clients, while 78.2% concurred that 
those providing such services could not maintain their independence. Adeyemi and 
Oloowokere (2012) established the most common perception of the main threat to auditors’ 
independence was self-interest, with 30.1% of responses. However, the majority (69.9%) of 
respondents chose some other factor as the main threat to independence; namely, self-review, 
advocacy, familiarity to trust or intimidation. Oloowokere and Soyemi (2013) surveyed the 
perceptions of 263 auditors, bankers and investors based on the extent of their agreement or 
disagreement with statements on auditors’ responsibilities, one of which addressed auditor bias 
and objectivity. These works share an approach that records and analyses respondents’ views 
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without investigating their reasons for holding them. To obtain an overall view from studies 
that consider specifically the effect of non-audit fees on auditor independence, it is necessary 
to look beyond recent Nigerian literature. 
2.2 Non-audit services 
Quantitative studies identifying signs of lack of auditor independence reveal inconsistent 
results. Frankel et al (2002) examined 3,074 proxy statements filed with the US SEC during 
2001. They concluded the existence of a positive relationship between non-audit fees and 
earnings management; whereby, the latter is taken as being the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals combined with small variations in performance from analyst forecasts. However, 
Ashbaugh et al (2003) reperformed a similar analysis on 3,170 firms proxy statements and 
found no statistically significant association to confirm the results reached by Frankel et al.  
In their experimental research, Joe and Vandervelde (2007) found that the provision of non-
audit services was associated with a lower assessment of risk of misstatements than where only 
audit was performed. However, the same study also found that an external auditor using the 
same staff to offer audit and non-audit services may provide benefits to the client in the form 
of the transfer of knowledge between non-audit and audit activity.   
In a Norwegian study conducted by Zhang et al (2016) on non-audit services and auditor 
independence, no relationship was found between non-audit services and auditors’ 
independence.  
Tepalagul and Lin’s (2015) literature review notes the lack of consistent empirical evidence to 
demonstrate non-audit services impair auditor independence. Indeed, the evidence suggests 
that offering tax-related non-audit services enhances audit quality. Nevertheless, there is 
evidence of a widely-held perception that auditors’ independence is hindered by offering non-
audit services.    
When Brandon et al (2004) reviewed 333 corporate bond ratings against non-audit fees, they 
found a significant negative relationship. This finding indicated that bond raters believed that 
auditors’ independence was impaired through non-audit fees; thereby increasing the risk. In the 
Saudi Arabian context, Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) argued that book-keeping, tax and 
management advisory services were all found to be offered as ancillary services to audit clients 
despite professional pronouncements that they posed a threat to independence. Based on their 
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findings, some users of financial reports in Saudi Arabia believed that the provision of non-
audit services can lead to the impairment of auditor’s independence. 
Such perceptions are significant as they may influence the actions of regulators. Thus, 
according to Edelman and Nicholson (2011), the publicly-documented failings of Arthur 
Andersen auditors influenced the subsequent Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This piece of 
legislation made it unlawful in the USA for a registered public accounting firm to provide a 
range of non-audit services to an audit client.  Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) compared audit 
fees before and after the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and identified an increase in audit 
fees, both from increased audit work required of the auditor and the cost associated with 
assuming liability for discharging greater responsibilities. 
Salehi et al (2009) surveyed 441 Iranian investors and Chartered Accountants. They found that 
while, in general, investors perceived greater threats to audit independence than auditors, there 
was no significant difference observed in the perceived threat presented by non-audit services. 
In a Nigerian survey of staff perceptions in the Ondo State Auditor General’s Office, 
respondents gave divided opinions on their agreement or disagreement with statements that 
auditor independence was compromised by non-audit fees. However, they predominantly 
agreed that an auditor’s access to information and knowledge of the client was enhanced by 
non-audit work (Akinbowale and Babatunde, 2017).  
2.3 Audit expectation gap 
Porter (1993) attributes the phrase “audit expectation gap” (AEG) to Liggio, (1974). The term 
is defined as the difference between levels of expected performance “envisioned by the 
independent accountant and by the user of financial statements”. From the evidence gathered 
from a New Zealand-based survey, Porter broadened the scope of the expectation gap to 
recognise the diversity in the expected performance levels of auditors and the actual 
achievements; in other words, to recognise a perceived “sub-standard” performance. This 
results in three divisions of the expectation gap for Porter: a “reasonableness gap” between 
what society expects from auditors and what could reasonably be delivered; and a 
“performance gap” between what could reasonably be delivered and what is perceived as being 
delivered. The performance gap is subdivided into “deficient standards” and “deficient 
performance”. Deficient standards represent a gap where regulations fail to require the 
expected performance. Deficient performance represents a gap where perceived performance 
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fails to meet that level required by the regulations. Porter’s overall result was that 34% of the 
gap was caused by unrealistic expectations, 50% by perceived deficiencies in standards, and 
16% by perceived deficient performance. 
Porter’s classification across the three elements of the expectation gap included a requirement 
for respondents to evaluate, for several activities, what they considered the existing duties of 
auditors and noted that some of both non-auditors and auditors made inaccurate statements. In 
Olowookere and Soyemi’s (2013) Nigerian study, 69% of respondents agreed or strongly 
agreed the auditor is responsible for producing the financial statements.  Recognising these 
presuppositions about an auditor’s role is important as it will influence the views individuals 
form about the extent of auditors’ independence. 
Onulaka’s (2015) survey identified self-regulation and inadequacy in company law as part of 
the deficient standard gap in Nigeria.  
In an empirical study ofthe existence of an audit expectation gap in Mauritius, Ramlugun 
(2014) found that the audit profession is currently under the spotlight given the number of 
financial scandals that have been uncovered globally. He further argued that these scandals not 
only have depressing consequences on business but also shake public confidence in the role of 
auditors.  
From a Nigerian perspective, Ekwueme (2000) and Okike (2004) observe the auditing 
profession has been facing a crisis of credibility. This can be attributed to the criticisms levelled 
against auditors for failing to meet society’s expectations following financial scandals in some 
of the large financial institutions with a high-profile rural network. For example, the rise in 
public expectation followed by the financial scandals and corporate collapse between 1998 and 
2007 has fueled the erosion of public confidence in the audit process in Nigeria (Ekwueme, 
2000). Examples in the financial service industry include the Intercontinental Bank Plc and 
Oceanic Bank Plc. The collapse of these banks shocked investors, potential investors, 
employees, creditors, and financial analysts (Ogundele et al, 2016). Atu and Atu (2010) in 
Nigeria found that the collapse of some banks and other companies arose from the financial 
scandal associated with unauthorised securities trading and falsified financial reporting, which 
placed the auditors in a poor light. Similarly, Akinbuli (2010) noted that the audit expectation 
gap undermined public confidence in the profession to detect and prevent corporate abuses and 
has made shareholders and the general public express their bitterness towards auditors in 
Nigeria. 
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2.4 Objective of the study 
Based on the studies discussed in Sections 2.1 to 2.3, the broad objective of this study is to 
explore the reported rationale behind perceptions of the influence of provision of non-audit 
services to audit clients on auditors’ independence and the audit expectation gap, using a 
broadly interpretative approach.  
The reported perceptions of audit partners and fund managers respectively are subjected to a 
thematic analysis to shed light on the participants’ views and the reasons behind them. 
Given a suitably critical interpretation by the reader, reported perceptions of auditors may 
contribute to an understanding of auditors’ “independence of mind”, while the responses of 
both auditors and pension fund managers may contribute evidence on which to base reasonable 
conclusions about “independence in appearance”.  
3. RESEARCH METHOD
This study adopted a qualitative research approach using thematic analysis developed in 
Onulaka and Samy (2017). This method was selected to facilitate a holistic view of the issue 
under investigation to develop, free from the strict imposition of an a priori determination or 
categorisation of responses (Cassell and Symon, 2004). This qualitative investigation tends 
towards constructivism as described and advocated by Power and Gendron (2015), who caution 
that according to Latour (2005) only “risky texts” can result, which remain open to challenge 
with alternative interpretations.   
As in Onulaka and Samy (2017), participants were either senior members of audit firms with 
post-qualification experience of 10 to 25 years, or Pension Fund Administrators (PFA) in the 
capacity of Investment Managers or Portfolio Managers with post-qualification experience of 
10 to 22 years. Participating auditors were responsible directly or indirectly for several audit 
clients or a related function. Participating Pension Fund Administrators are currently active in 
the capital market with close links to Fund Custodians and the National Pension Commission. 
Auditors are the suppliers of external audit services to their client companies. Given 
independence is viewed from one perspective as “a state of mind”, it is not directly observable. 
Thus, it is necessary to enquire from auditors what their state of mind is and the associated 
influential factors. The use of Audit Partners to represent auditors is justified as they are the 
key players in auditing industries.   
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Companies are the consumers of external auditors’ services, but are unable to speak for 
themselves, other than through directors or shareholders. This study considers shareholders, 
rather than directors, to be the preferred proxy for the company whose interest the auditors 
serve. Their perceptions are also investigated by this study and present a balance to the auditors’ 
views, as auditors and shareholders may be regarded as having differing, if overlapping, 
interests in a company’s audit. The use of Pension Fund Managers to represent investors is 
justified by virtue of Section 73 (1) of the Nigerian Pension Reform Act 2004. As noted in the 
annual abstract of the Nigerian Federal Office of Statistics for 2015, more than 500 billion 
Naira worth of pension fund investment portfolios were being traded on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange.  
All organisations from which participants were drawn for this study were from the private 
sector. Of the respondents, 10 were chosen from each of the country’s three major regions; 
namely, the North, East and Western regions of Nigeria. The interviews were conducted in 
Abuja in the North, Enugu and Awka in the East, and Lagos in the West. Abuja, Enugu and 
Lagos were selected because they are the largest commercial centres of each of the chosen 
regions for this study, with some of the Eastern region respondents being interviewed in Awka 
while they attended a professional conference. The high level of commercial activity also 
attracts Chartered Accountants and audit firms to these areas. 
A semi-structured, face-to-face interview was undertaken. The sample size of 30 participants 
(i.e. 15 interviews for auditors and 15 for fund managers) was considered suitable for this study 
as the emphasis was on depth rather than breadth, and to become saturated with information on 
the topic (Braun and Clarke 2006; Bordens and Abbott, 2014). Once 10 to 12 participants from 
each of the two major groups in the study had been interviewed separately, the responses of 
the remaining participants were almost determined and a saturation point was reached. 
Experimental findings of Guest et al (2006) indicate saturation occurring within the first 12 
interviews, with metathemes apparent from as early as the sixth interview.  All 30 participants 
are Chartered Accountants with a significant wealth of practical experience.  
3.1 Reliability of the data and analysis 
The authors recognise the possibility of challenging the use of an auditor’s reported perceptions 
to evaluate a respondent’s independence. Furthermore, the responses of Pension Fund 
Administrators regarding others’ independence might be interpreted as giving a platform to a 
biased view.  
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The responses of auditors and pension fund managers are summarised separately, with 
discussion of the responses identifying to which group the respondents belong. Thus, any bias 
that reflects the interests of the respondents in their roles as auditors or pension fund managers 
is prevented from distorting the overall results. 
Reported perceptions do not provide proof of the respondents’ actual perceptions, nor of the 
extent to which those perceptions are well informed. Nevertheless, the authors believe valuable 
evidence may be gained from reported perceptions, especially when there is a large degree of 
consistency within or across the two groups of respondents.   
The anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents was ensured so they were able to provide 
information strictly for the purpose of this study. Where possible, some of the participants were 
interviewed twice following the unearthing of new information post-interview (Horton et al, 
2004). Draft transcripts and analysis of the interviews were sent to participants for validation, 
and confirmation of correctness requested, as most of the responses were received by 
telephone. Data collections were made at different points across the three specified regions, 
and from more than one set of individuals at different times.     
Auditor participants were contacted through the Directory of Members in Practice using the 
Year Books of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants and the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN). Auditors represented a range of large, medium and 
small-sized audit practices, with approximately half of the respondents representing small 
practices. Coverage across all geographical regions was obtained for each category of 
respondent, as presented in Table 1.  
Table 1 here 
Small and medium-sized audit practices were those whose clients are mostly small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and who made use of external resources to cover limited in-
house technical resources. For Nigeria, small entities are those whose staff numbers range 
between 1 and 10, and whose assets range between 1 million and 5 million Naira, while medium 
enterprises range between 10 to 50 members of staff and total assets spanning 5 million and 
250 million Naira. 
Pension Fund Administrator participants were identified from the Directory of Pension Fund 
Administrators in Nigeria (DPFA) regularly published in the website of the Association of 
Fund Managers of Nigeria and, in most cases, by asking earlier interviewees to suggest names 
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of those they would recommend to speak with the authorities on the issues or who held views 
they opposed (Horton et al, 2004). Thus snowball sampling was used in this investigation, 
which Groenewald (2006) states is a method of expanding the sample by asking one informant 
or participant to recommend others for further interviews. In locating the interviewees who 
have had experiences related to the study phenomenon, the researchers used the internet search 
engine. This also created a platform for sending e-mails and making follow-up telephone calls 
to participants in the audit firms and Pension Fund Administrators in Lagos, Abuja, Awka and 
Enugu.     
4. DATA ANALYSIS
Thematic analysis is a method used by the authors because it is not wedded into a pre-existing 
framework; therefore, it is theoretically flexible (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Previous studies 
have tended to measure perceptions based on a Likert-type scale of agreement or disagreement 
with a set phrase determined by the researchers. The technique used in this analysis is drawn 
from the interpretivist tradition, as referenced below, to allow the emergence of themes from 
the respondents’ comments. Such emergent themes, which have not been predetermined by the 
researchers, may provide novel insights. Therefore, the method used to identify the relevant 
themes in this study is conventional and appropriate to the study phenomenon (Tesch, 1990; 
Turnnidge et al, 2012). The following steps were adopted in developing the themes and 
subthemes: 
• With the permission of the interviewees, each interview was audio-recorded and
labeled with an assigned code (Groenewald, (2006); Bowen, (2005); Fink, (2000)
and Ogiri, (2012)).
• The recorded data were transcribed and read repeatedly to enable the authors to
become familiar with the datasets (Ryan and Bernard, 2003).
• The transcripts were read and re-read. Therefore, through familiarisation with the
datasets, the authors could establish patterns and relationships in the various
interview transcripts, and initial codes were generated (Sandelowiski, 1995 p. 373).
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• As repetition is one of the easiest ways to identify themes, some of the most obvious
in the corpus of data were recurring topics or phrases across the interview
transcripts (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). From the in-depth interviews on a range of
audit issues, it became apparent that the participants referred repeatedly to common
ideas. In line with Strauss (1992) and Braun and Clarke (2006), it was concluded
that these ideas were important themes in the phenomena under investigation. The
authors discovered the relationships among these ideas by writing the concepts on
a piece of paper and connecting them with lines to the verbatim expressions and
quotes in the transcripts. In accordance with Weller and Romney (1988) and after
Clarke and Spence (2013), the data was sorted after identifying the quotes or
expressions and categorised as deemed relevant.
• The final step in the data collection process was to name the themes after which the
results were summarised and presented in quote form in a table.
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4.1 Data Coding 
Interview transcripts were subjected to both open and hierarchical coding on issues pertaining 
to the interviewee’s perception of the effect of the provision of non-audit services on auditors’ 
independence in Nigeria and the audit expectation gap. The interview coding was guided by a 
list of predefined issues, themes, and categories, which were developed by the authors after the 
interviews had been conducted and transcribed. 
The authors applied a systematic, line-by-line coding as a control measure to focus on the 
content of the text in the lines, which helps us concentrate on the research topic. Subsequently, 
descriptive codes were produced and analytic codes developed later in a code list.   
The code list covered key issues emerging from the interview questions and more specific 
patterns that became apparent during the data collection process. The authors adopted the 
approach used in Attride-Stirling (2001) in developing and controlling the code list.  
The themes that emerged on the provision of non-audit services to audit clients were: 
❖ Loss of auditors’ independence
❖ Loss of public confidence in the audit process
❖ Economic environment
❖ Permissive auditing standards
❖ Effect on audit expectation gap.
Categorised response quotes from the participants used to inform the findings are collated 
under each of the above themes in Table 2. The category of respondent is identified by the 
bracketed references after each comment, as follows: large sized “big 4” audit firm 
practitioner ‘L’; medium-sized firm audit practitioner ‘M’; small firm audit practitioner ‘S’; 
and pension fund administrator ‘P’. Respondents are not identified by region in Table 2 to 
ensure the preservation of their anonymity.  
Quotes from the interviewees on the identified themes are reproduced below in Table 2 to 
allow readers to make their own interpretations of results, after Latour (2005). The free-form 
nature of the responses leaves them open to a considerable degree of interpretation by 
readers. Readers may choose to interpret responses in the context of the group to which the 
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respondent belongs, or the manner of language in which a view was expressed. Some 
responses are difficult to take at face value while also remaining meaningful.  
Further discussion of the answers given by respondents in Table 2 will be addressed in detail 
per theme in the findings section. 
Table 2 here 
In Table 3, the percentage presented in each box indicates the number of affirmative 
perceptions of the research participants on the various themes and the difference constituting 
the expectation gap.  
Table 3 here 
5. FINDINGS
The scores for positively identifying each of the themes reveal high percentages in all themes, 
as illustrated in Table 3. This is a natural consequence of the thematic analysis, as an 
infrequently occurring view would not be identified as a theme. Results were further analysed 
to consider the responses from pension fund managers, who represent institutional investors, 
compared with those from auditors. Auditor responses were analysed across those from 
auditors from large (“big 4”), medium-sized and small practices. Statements by which 
respondents justified the view they expressed are also grouped within each theme discussed 
below. 
5.1 Loss of independence 
The results presented in Table 3 reveal that 90% of all respondents, of whom 87% are auditors 
and 93% Pension Fund Administrators, positively identified provision of non-audit services 
with loss of independence. The theme arose in all discussions with respondents, as presented 
in Table 2. More Pension Fund Administrators than auditors supported their view with an 
explanation.  
Of those not responding positively, from Table 2, one large firm auditor (L4) and one Pension 
Fund Administrator (P13) noted that an auditor could avoid threats to independence by 
clarifying their standpoint to the client. One medium-sized firm auditor (M2) concurred with 
(P13) that the threat to independence correlated with the size of the fee.  
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Of those responding positively, from Table 2, 10 auditors and five Pension Fund 
Administrators provided simple statements of agreement.  
One large firm auditor (L3) made the intriguing statement that “…50% of his independence 
would be affected” and two Pension Fund Administrators (P9 and P15) believed non-audit 
services were discouraged by regulations.  
One small firm auditor (S6) and two Pension Fund Administrators (P3 and P5) stated auditors 
should not undertake non-audit work for their clients. 
One large firm auditor (L1) and one Pension Fund Administrator (P2) identified the threat to 
independence as self-review. Two Pension Fund Administrators identified the threats as 
overfamiliarity with (P7 and P10) and economic reliance on the client (P6 and P12). 
The perceptions of auditors and Pension Fund Administrators on this theme appear closely 
aligned, confirming the findings of Salehi et al (2009), with large firm auditors and Pension 
Fund Administrators more likely to explain their view. 
5.2 Loss of public confidence 
The results presented in Table 3 reveal that 77% of all respondents, of whom 73% are auditors 
and 80% Pension Fund Administrators, positively identified provision of non-audit services 
with loss of public confidence. As presented in Table 2, the theme arose in all discussions, with 
the exception of one Pension Fund Administrator (P3).    
Of those not responding positively, from Table 2, one medium-sized firm auditor (M3) and one 
Pension Fund Administrator (P13) gave simple statements of disagreement, alongside the 
Pension Fund Administrator who did not identify the theme.  
One Pension Fund Administrator (P9) stated the auditor possessed the expertise to put records 
in order. One small firm auditor (S7) noted an auditor was free to decline non-audit work 
according to his or her ethics, while a second (S4) stated the auditor would not keep the 
accounting records that he or she would audit. 
Large firm auditor (L4) gave the enigmatic response “the public can think anything they like”. 
Of those responding positively, from Table 2, one medium-sized firm auditor (M2) qualified 
the threat to public confidence with a link to the value of the non-audit service fee. Five auditors 
and eight Pension Fund Administrators provided simple statements of agreement.   
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One small firm auditor (S3) referred explicitly to a threat to independence from self-review, 
which was mirrored by Pension Fund Administrators (P6) “(provision of) accountancy services 
is like beating the drum and doing the dancing”, and (P8) “you can’t prepare the account and 
audit yourself”.  
Two small firm auditors (S2 and S4) related the loss of public confidence to overfamiliarity 
with the client.  
A medium-sized firm auditor (M1) linked the loss of confidence with the fall of Enron, a 
Pension Fund Administrator (P12) stated it was a major cause of the expectation gap and (P5) 
suggested it should form the basis of an amended standard.  
The above finding is in line with the study by Edelman and Nicholson (2011) referred to above, 
noting the significance of the failed Enron Corporation, and the impact on US legislation in the 
2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act.  
5.3 Economic environment 
The results presented in Table 3 reveal that 60% of all respondents, of whom 67% are auditors 
and 53% Pension Fund Administrators, positively identified the provision of non-audit services 
with the economic environment. This was the issue that arose with the lowest frequency, with 
four auditors and three Pension Fund Managers not discussing the theme.   
Of those responding to, but not affirming, the link between non-audit services and the economic 
environment, from Table 2, one small firm auditor (S5) and two Pension Fund Administrators 
(P12 and P14) agreed that while the economy was bad, ethical integrity should continue to 
prevail. One Pension Fund Administrator (P9) believed integrity was unrelated to economic 
conditions, while another, (P6), believed adequate safeguards existed.   
Of those responding positively, from Table 2, one auditor and one Pension Fund Administrator 
provided simple statements of agreement.  
One small practice auditor (S2) attributed the link between non-audit services and the economic 
environment with a downward pressure on audit fees. The issues identified most frequently 
across all categories of respondent was the economic necessity of the auditor generating an 
adequate income in order to survive. This can be seen to drive auditors towards accepting non-
audit work while regulations permit. 
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These views were the most emphatic and strongly expressed views of all themes. Highly 
charged language was used to explain the issues auditors faced citing survival, a need to pay 
bills and wages, unemployment and the difficulty of getting jobs.  
This venting of frustration of both auditors and Pension Fund Managers as institutional 
investors was the most striking single finding of the research. However, Joe and Vandervelde’s 
(2007) experimental research noted a downwards pressure on audit fees as a result of the 
benefits to auditor knowledge of non-audit services.    
Other responses suggest a different view of the “environment” had been taken. One small 
practice auditor (S7) and one Pension Fund Administrator (P7) linked the environment with 
the permissive nature of the regulatory environment. A Pension Fund Administrator (P1) 
associated the environment with the conflicting interests of directors who, in substance, 
appointed the auditor then required them to report on stewardship, while another administrator 
(P2) referred obliquely to “our local issues”. 
 5.4 Allowed by the auditing standard 
The results presented in Table 3 reveal that 77% of all respondents, of whom 87% are auditors 
and 67% Pension Fund Administrators, positively identified provision of non-audit services 
with permissive auditing standards. Similar to section 5.3, some respondents did not identify 
permissive auditing standards as an issue; namely, one large firm auditor and three Pension 
Fund Administrators.  
Of those not responding positively, from Table 2, one medium-sized firm auditor (M3) 
responded that non-audit services were beneficial, one Pension Fund Administrator (P10) 
declined to share a view as he or she was “not current”, and an administrator (P14) stated that 
ethics should entail high standards even if this was not included in the regulations.    
Of those responding positively, from Table 2, seven auditors and three Pension Fund 
Administrators provided simple statements of agreement that standards allowed, accepted or 
encouraged non-audit services.  
One small (S3) and one medium-sized (M1) firm auditor felt independence was affected by 
standards allowing non-audit services, but recordkeeping and financial reporting was 
enhanced. This view was shared by two Pension Fund Administrators (P3 and P4).    
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One large firm auditor (L3) indicated there was nothing wrong with providing non-audit 
services if standards permitted. However, another large firm auditor (L2) and Pension Fund 
Administrator (P11) believed the provision of non-audit services should be regulated.  
One small firm auditor (S6) suggested the permissive attitude towards non-audit services 
represented a loophole in the standard, while one Pension Fund Administrator (P8) pinpointed 
auditing standards as the source of the problem associated with the provision of non-audit 
services. Another small firm audit practitioner (S8) and three Pension Fund Administrators (P7, 
P12 and P15) claimed the permissive nature of auditing standards furthered auditor self-
interest.  
More auditors than Pension Fund Administrators identified audit standards as an issue related 
to non-audit fees. Otherwise, the mixed responses indicated a variety of opinions about whether 
the permissive attitude of auditing standards to non-audit services was viewed favourably or 
unfavourably. This reflects the uncertainty in empirical evidence on whether non-audit services 
enhance or detract from audit work, as noted in the literature review of Tepalagul and Lin 
(2015).  
5.5 Weak provision in the auditing standard increased expectation gap 
The results presented in Table 3 reveal that 84% of all respondents, of whom 80% are auditors 
and 87% Pension Fund Administrators, positively identified the provision of non-audit services 
with an increasing expectation gap. Consideration of the theme generated mixed views from 
auditors, while Pension Fund Administrators shared the view of the existence of a positive link, 
with the exception of two who did not identify the issue. 
Of those not responding positively, from Table 2, one large (L4) and one medium-sized (M2) 
firm auditor disagreed that non-audit services contributed to an expectation gap, while another 
medium-sized firm auditor (M3) declared that the gap could be bridged by educating the public. 
Of those responding positively, from Table 2, six auditors and five Pension Fund 
Administrators provided simple statements of agreement.  
Two small firm auditors noted their confidence in the financial statements contributing to the 
expectation gap (S1) and related to the threat posed to independence by self-review (S7). One 
medium-sized firm auditor (M1) referred to the case of Enron as an analogous contribution to 
the expectation gap.  
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One small firm auditor (S8) did not provide any consultancy to audit clients because of the 
contribution to an expectation gap. 
Pension Fund Administrators who agreed with a contribution made by non-audit services to 
widening the expectation gap, identified a link between independence and the expectation gap 
(P8). Auditors work would be perceived as not being undertaken as it should (P3), the 
involvement of all “big 4” firms made this a major cause of the expectation gap (P12), and 
“when the client gives you additional services he will buy your conscience” (P15).  
Qualified agreement was offered by two small firm auditors on the basis that the contribution 
to the expectation gap depended on the firm involved (S4) or the auditor’s failure to “draw the 
line” (S5). Pension Fund Administrators concurred with S5 on ‘line drawing’ (P9), or qualified 
their agreement depending on the service provided (P7 and P10) or the need for the public to 
be educated (P13). 
Respondents’ perceptions of the effect of non-audit services on the expectation gap were 
mixed. The only auditors who expressed an opinion that non-audit services did not contribute 
to the expectation gap were from large or medium-sized firms. This view is consistent with the 
survey of Akinbowale and Babatunde (2017) and might be validated by the experimental 
research of Joe and Vandervelde (2007); thereby indicating the benefits of knowledge transfer 
to audit quality. However, perceptions would need to change for the “deficient standards” or 
“deficient performance” gaps to be narrowed, as defined by Porter (1993). This supports the 
views that the public needs to be educated. 
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6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
By facilitating the emergence of themes from semi-structured interviews, this study has 
identified a widely-held view that providing non-audit services is an economic necessity for 
the survival of Nigerian audit practitioners. As a phenomenological study, the study has 
revealed environmental, legal, political and economic factors. This is evident from the study 
findings, which contribute to an increase in the audit expectation gap. The policy implications 
of the study include the identification of the need for review to recognise the current economic 
realities in rules for the appointment and removal of external auditors. This study finds that 
while auditors are allowed to offer non-audit services, competition for appointments may drive 
down auditing fees below the market price required for an effective independent audit; thereby 
indicating that packaging audit and non-audit services compromise independence, which 
follows on from the work of Joe and Vandervelde (2007). Based on overlapping information 
from the research participants, prevention of provision of non-audit services to audit clients by 
external auditors should be explored. This is in line with the evidence provided in the study 
conducted by Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) that this raised levels of fee income for auditors. 
The study opens the door for future global research in the same area; this is anticipated to 
enhance the practical impact of the current research and strengthen the contribution of the study 
to cover other countries worldwide, which will be an additional contribution of the present 
study. 
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Table 1 
Auditor respondents by size of audit practice and regions. 
Size 
Region 
Frequency Percentage 
Northern Eastern Western 
Large “big 4” practice 1 2 1 4 27% 
Medium-sized 
practice 
1 1 1 3 20% 
Small-sized practice 3 2 3 8 53% 
Total 5 5 5 15 100% 
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Table 2 
Provision of non-audit services to audit client – responses Audit Partners and Pension 
Fund Administrators 
‘L’ Large sized “big 4” audit firm practitioner, ‘M’: Medium-sized firm audit practitioner, 
‘S’: Small-sized firm audit practitioner, and ‘P’: Pension fund administrator. 
Themes 
1 2 3 4 5 
Loss of 
independence 
Loss of 
public 
confidence 
Economic 
environment 
Allowed by 
audit standard 
Increase in 
expectation 
gap 
“There will be 
conflict or threat to 
independence, so it 
is as if you are 
auditing yourself. 
There will not be 
sincerity there so 
that’s what I mean.” 
(L1) 
“Handle such 
consultancy 
job like 
taxation. 
Owned by the 
same audit 
firm. Like I 
said before, 
there will be 
conflict, so 
that 
independence 
will not be 
there”. (L1) 
“It definitely 
increases the 
expectation 
gap.” (L1) 
“Yes, it will impede 
independence.” 
(L2) 
“Yes, there 
will be loss of 
confidence 
because the 
general public 
will look at the 
audit report as 
a man no man 
affair.” (L2) 
“Yes, our 
economy is bad, 
but one should 
not compromise 
his integrity.” 
(L2) 
“Our law should 
be amended to 
discourage taking 
other services 
from an audit 
client.” (L2) 
“Definitely it will 
help in widening 
the expectation 
gap.” (L2) 
“At least 50% of his 
independence will 
be affected.” (L3) 
“Yes, even 
now, many 
have started 
losing 
confidence in 
the audit 
process.” (L3) 
“We need to 
pay our staff, 
provided we 
have the 
capacity,” 
 (L3) 
“I don’t think 
there is anything 
wrong in 
providing tax or 
accounting 
services so long 
as it is in the 
standard.” (L3) 
“I do believe it 
increases the 
expectation 
gap.” (L3) 
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Loss of 
independence 
Loss of 
public 
confidence 
Economic 
environment 
Allowed by 
audit standard 
Increase in 
expectation 
gap 
“To me, it will not if 
you explain your 
stand to the client.”  
(L4) 
“The public 
can feel 
anything they 
like.” (L4)  
“Yes, our 
economic 
climate is too 
harsh so the 
little you have, 
you will be 
praying for 
another job from 
the client.”  (L4) 
“The standard 
encourages us to 
do it but to make 
sure it is clearly 
stated in our 
engagement 
letter.” (L4) 
“Well, I don’t 
believe it can 
increase the 
expectation gap.”  
(L4) 
“His independence 
will be impaired.” 
(M1) 
“Certainly, 
since the fall of 
Enron and 
WorldCom., 
people started 
losing interest 
in our 
services.” (M1) 
“People may be, 
but it is another 
way of ensuring 
that proper 
books are kept.” 
(M1) 
“It will affect the 
gap. Just look at 
an auditor in 
charge of the 
company in the 
Enron case was 
formally among 
one of the big 7 
whom we are 
looking at as our 
role model.”  
 (M1) 
“It depends on the 
value to the overall 
audit income.”  (M2) 
“Yes, as I said 
earlier, it 
depends on the 
value of such 
services. If it is 
high, it will 
affect public 
confidence.” 
(M2) 
“We need to 
engage in other 
services in 
order to pay 
our bills.” (M2) 
“Yes, our 
auditing 
standard allows 
such services.” 
(M2) 
“I don’t think it 
will affect the 
expectation gap.” 
(M2) 
“It will impede 
independence or not 
will be on average.”  
(M3) 
“I don’t think it 
will impede 
more than 
average public 
confidence.” 
(M3) 
“Personally, I 
believe it is better 
for the auditor to 
handle a 
reasonable 
portion of NAS.” 
(M3) 
“The public is 
educated. they 
know the scope 
of audit and that 
it will bridge the 
gap.”  (M3) 
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Loss of 
independence 
Loss of 
public 
confidence 
Economic 
environment 
Allowed by 
audit standard 
Increase in 
expectation 
gap 
“In short, doing an 
accountancy job and 
auditing the same 
account you prepare 
will influence the 
independence of the 
auditor.” (S1) 
“It will be 
doubtful 
because there 
is no checks 
and balances in 
such a 
situation.” (S1) 
“The harsh 
economic 
situation in 
Nigeria.” (S1) 
“The standard 
encourages other 
services, like 
accountancy 
services and tax, 
to be performed.” 
(S1) 
“The reliability 
and public 
confidence in the 
financial 
statement will be 
in question so it 
affects the gap.”  
(S1) 
“It will impede 
auditors’ 
independence.” 
(S2) 
“The 
Professional 
Practice 
Monitoring 
Committee 
says that 
practice should 
rotate their 
staff so as to 
avoid over 
familiarity, 
which can 
create doubt.” 
 (S2) 
“Sometimes we 
come ‘down’ in 
order to get our 
pay. So, it is an 
environmental 
factor.” (S2) 
“It is acceptable 
within the 
provision of the 
present auditing 
standard.” (S2)  
“It increases the 
expectation 
gap.” (S2) 
“When you provide 
some services to 
your client, it will 
impede your 
independence.” (S3) 
“Nobody 
assesses 
himself and 
marks himself 
badly, so when 
an auditor 
prepares a 
financial 
statement and 
comes to audit 
that same 
financial 
statements, 
what do you 
expect? There 
will be 
conflict.”  (S3) 
‘In order to 
survive in our 
own 
environment, 
we take any 
additional 
services; be it 
accountancy or 
tax from an 
audit client.” 
(S3)  
“Except the audit 
standard 
disallowed it, but 
now we provide 
such services 
even though it 
may affect 
independence. 
But it also helps 
ensure the right 
thing is done.” 
(S3) 
“No matter what 
we claim to be, 
provision of NAS 
increases the 
expectation 
gap.” (S3) 
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Loss of 
independence 
Loss of 
public 
confidence 
Economic 
environment 
Allowed by 
audit standard 
Increase in 
expectation 
gap 
“It will affect 
auditors’ 
independence no 
matter how you look 
at it.” (S4) 
“Yes, by being 
too close, 
people will 
doubt your 
credibility.” 
(S4) 
“You know, in 
these days of 
high-level 
unemployment, 
we can take 
additional audit 
jobs.” (S4) 
“It is stated in our 
engagement letter 
before we start 
the audit, so is 
allowed.” (S4) 
“Well, it can 
affect the 
expectation gap 
depending on the 
firm.” (S4) 
“The best is to avoid 
such services if you 
want to maintain 
your independence, 
otherwise you lose 
your 
independence.” (S5) 
“I do not agree 
because the 
records used 
for 
accountancy 
services are not 
kept by the 
auditor.”  (S5) 
“We grab other 
services that 
come our way in 
order to 
survive.” (S5) 
“It is not illegal 
since the auditing 
standard allows 
it, except the 
standard is 
reviewed to 
exclude it.” (S5) 
“It can increase 
the expectation 
gap if one does 
not draw the 
line.” (S5) 
“The bottom line is 
if you provide NAS, 
don’t audit; and if 
you audit, don’t 
provide NAS 
otherwise there will 
be a loss of 
independence.”  
(S6) 
“Definitely, it 
can erode 
public 
confidence in 
an audit.”  (S6) 
“These are some 
of the loopholes 
in the standard.”  
(S6) 
“Yes, it can 
increase the 
expectation 
gap.”  (S6) 
“Auditor’s 
independence can 
be impaired where 
you are supplying 
other services to an 
audit client.”  (S7) 
“Observe the 
ethics and you 
will even know 
when to say no 
to certain 
offers, whether 
they are 
ancillary work 
or any other 
such offer.”  
(S7) 
“Some countries 
do not allow you 
to be a tax 
consultant to 
your audit 
client, but it is 
permitted by our 
economic 
environment.”  
(S7) 
“Nothing says 
that your 
independence is 
lost because of 
rendering other 
services the 
standards allows 
it.” (S7) 
“Naturally, when 
you render other 
services to audit 
clients, you are 
more or less 
becoming part of 
the system and it 
will no doubt 
increase the 
gap.”  (S7) 
“It affects an 
auditor’s 
independence 
posture.”  (S8) 
“When 
independence 
is in question, 
public 
confidence 
will not be 
there.”  (S8) 
“We do all that 
comes our way 
because there is 
a high level of 
unemployment.
” (S8) 
“The standard 
allows it because 
the regulators of 
the auditing 
profession want it 
for their own 
gain.” (S8)  
“Handling other 
services, like 
accountancy, will 
increase the 
expectation gap, 
which is why we 
don’t do 
consultancy with 
audit clients in 
our firm.” (S8) 
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Loss of 
independence 
Loss of 
public 
confidence 
Economic 
environment 
Allowed by 
audit standard 
Increase in 
expectation 
gap 
“Under those 
circumstances, loss 
of independence 
must be there.”  (P1) 
“Yes, because 
by providing 
ancillary 
services to 
audit clients, 
the public 
won’t trust 
the auditor 
again.” (P1) 
“As I said, the 
environment 
has created a 
situation where 
the auditor 
doing his job the 
way he should, 
will run into 
problems with 
the person who 
appointed him.”  
(P1) 
“Definitely, it 
will affect the 
expectation 
gap.”  (P1) 
“If auditors are 
rendering accounting 
services, you cannot 
prepare financial 
statements and 
simultaneously be 
the auditor…your 
independence will 
be impaired.” (P2) 
“Yes, it can 
affect public 
confidence in 
the audit 
process and 
audit report.” 
(P2) 
“You know we 
have an 
environmental 
issue…that is 
our local 
issues.” (P2) 
“It can affect 
the expectation 
gap.” (P2)  
“If the auditor 
provides a service 
other than audit, he 
must not be the one 
that does the audit, 
otherwise his 
independence will 
be affected.”  (P3)  
“An external 
auditor is needed 
to help by 
making sure that 
all anomalies he 
observed in the 
system are 
corrected by 
participating.” 
(P3)  
“The public will 
think that the 
auditor is not 
doing his work 
as it should be 
done.”  (P3)  
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“It is a clear point 
that taking up 
ancillary services 
with audit clients 
will affect auditors’ 
independence 
posture.” (P4)  
“Yes, it can 
lead to loss of 
public 
confidence.”  
(P4) 
“An audit firm that 
provides audit and 
assurance services 
should not at the 
same time provide 
non-audit services as 
it impairs 
independence.” (P5) 
“Erosion of 
public 
confidence 
with the audit 
process and 
provide a 
platform for 
amending the 
present 
standard.” (P5) 
“Yes, that is one 
of the loopholes 
in the standard, so 
it is there. But it is 
also a way of 
making sure that 
correct things are 
done.” (P5)  
“You see, you can’t 
be hard on someone 
that gives you food, 
so it must affect 
your 
independence.” (P6) 
“Yes, people 
will lose 
confidence, 
especially in 
accountancy 
services. It is 
like beating the 
drum and 
doing the 
dancing.” (P6) 
“The ancillary 
services are 
handled by their 
consultancy 
outfit and I 
don’t see 
anything wrong 
with that.”  (P6) 
“The standard 
allows it.” (P6) 
“Yes, it will 
affect AEG if the 
service questions 
auditors’ 
independence.” 
(P6) 
“It brings too much 
familiarity that will, 
in turn, affect 
independence.” 
(P7) 
“I think it 
reduces public 
confidence in 
the audit 
report.”  (P7) 
“All the big 4 
firms do it so 
the law allows it 
and our 
economic 
environment 
too.”  (P7) 
“To me, auditors 
are hiding too 
much in the 
auditing 
standard to do 
whatever they 
like.”  (P7) 
“It will reduce 
credibility and 
hence, increase 
the expectation 
gap.”  (P7) 
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“It will bring the 
independence of the 
auditor to 
question.” (P8) 
“Sure, sure, 
people will 
lose 
confidence; 
you can’t 
prepare the 
account and 
audit yourself.” 
(P8) 
“You know the 
economy is bad 
when they have 
to take 
additional 
services.” (P8) 
‘To me, the 
auditing 
standards setting 
is where the 
problem lies.”  
(P8) 
“Yes, auditors’ 
independence 
and the 
expectation gap 
have a close 
relationship.” 
(P8) 
“I think IFAC 
discourages 
provision of NAS 
because of a 
possible threat to 
independence.”  
(P9) 
“To me, it will 
not because 
they have the 
expertise to put 
the records in 
order.” (P9) 
“No matter the 
economic 
condition in 
Nigeria, taking 
ancillary 
services with 
audit clients will 
jeopardize their 
integrity.” (P9)  
“Yes, provision of 
NAS is permitted 
by the 
standard.”  (P9) 
“It will affect the 
expectation gap 
where the auditor 
is unable to draw 
the line and 
maintain his 
integrity.” (P9) 
“You know, too 
much familiarity 
brings contempt.”  
(P10) 
“Yes, it will 
erode public 
confidence in 
the audit 
claim.  (P10) 
“They can’t 
because they 
have to 
survive.” (P10) 
“To me, I can’t 
say for sure 
because I am not 
current.” (P10) 
“Tax and others 
affect the 
expectation 
gap.” (P10) 
“Provision of NAS 
or accountancy 
services will impede 
independence.”  
(P11) 
“Yes, it will 
also affect 
public 
confidence in 
the audit 
report.”   (P11) 
“Yes, especially 
for younger 
audit firms, you 
cannot avoid it. 
They must 
survive.” (P11) 
“The expectation 
gap will continue 
unabated unless 
the law prohibits 
such services to 
the audit client.”  
(P11) 
“It will 
naturally affect 
the expectation 
gap.”   (P11) 
“Naturally, you can 
be hard on the 
person that is 
feeding you even 
when the law 
permits it. So, it will 
put auditors’ 
independence to 
question.”  (P12) 
“Certainly, it 
will erode 
public 
confidence and 
is the major 
cause of 
AEG.”  (P12) 
“Yes, I agree the 
economy is 
hard, but the 
auditor should 
maintain his 
integrity.”  
(P12) 
“The standard 
allows them to 
help their 
members.”  (P12) 
“As I have said 
earlier, it is the 
major cause of 
the expectation 
gap because all 
the big 4 firms 
are doing it.”  
(P12) 
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“In the long run, it 
will affect auditor’s 
independence.”   
(P14) 
“Certainly, it 
will create 
some doubt in 
the mind of the 
public.”   (P14) 
“You can’t 
because the 
economy is bad 
and do what is 
wrong.”  (P14) 
“The standard 
allows it, but we 
can’t take bribes 
simply because 
the standard did 
not say.”  (P14) 
“It is a 
contributing 
factor to AEG.” 
(P14) 
“Yes, it will affect 
auditors’ 
independence 
because we are 
asked not to due to 
the possible threat to 
independence.”   
(P15) 
“You can’t do 
accountancy 
work and at the 
same time 
audit the 
accounts, as 
the public will 
doubt the 
credibility of 
your report.”   
(P15) 
“I agree, 
economic 
factors can 
contribute to 
it.” (P15)  
“Yes, because the 
regulators of 
audit practice 
tacitly allow the 
creation of jobs 
for their 
members.”   (P15) 
“It will affect 
AEG to a large 
extent because 
when the client 
gives you 
additional 
services, he will 
buy your 
conscience and 
you will not 
talk.”  (P15) 
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Table 3 
Summary of perceptions of the provision of non-audit services to audit clients and the 
associated causes and effects as represented by themes. 
No. Themes 
Affirmative 
responses: 
Auditors 
Affirmative 
responses: 
Fund 
Managers 
Affirmative 
responses: 
All 
Respondents 
Freq. 
out of 
15 
% 
Freq. 
out of 
15 
% 
Freq. 
out of 
30 
% 
1 Loss of independence 13 87% 14 93% 27 90% 
2 Loss of public confidence 11 73% 12 80% 23 77% 
3 Economic environment 10 67% 8 53% 18 60% 
4 Allowed by audit standard 13 87% 10 67% 23 77% 
5 
Increase the expectation 
gap 
12 80% 13 87% 25 84% 
